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Departing from the traditional yardsticks for measuring the performance and 
effectiveness of regional institutions, this paper proposes a new framework to investigate 
their effect in the socialization (i.e. internalization of group norms by newcomers) of new 
members. Called Type III internalization, it represents a middle ground between Type I 
(i.e. member states simply acting according to group expectations, even if they may not 
agree with them), and Type II (i.e. states transforming themselves by adopting the 
interests and identities of the group) internalization. In Type III internalization, states act 
both instrumentally and normatively.   While their interests and values do not change 
permanently, there is enough change to induce substantially new kinds of cooperative 
behavior, in trade and security.  Type III internalization is non-legalistic and consensual, 
moving at a pace in which everyone is comfortable, but there is no danger of 
backtracking. New members moderate their competitive instincts and pursue common 
objectives. The impact of institutional norms such as “open regionalism” and 
“cooperative security” transmitted through institutions such as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum on Viet Nam, India, and the People's Republic of China attests to the 
existence of a Type III internalization. 
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This essay examines the socializing effect of Asian regional institutions, using the 
theoretical and conceptual prism of constructivist approaches to international relations. It 
is divided into three parts. The first briefly outlines the main and distinctive arguments of 
constructivism as a theory (or at least a perspective) on the study of international 
relations. Since socialization as a concept is deeply embedded in the theoretical 
literature of constructivism, it is useful to begin the essay by looking at the core 
assumptions and arguments of constructivism. Such an exercise also helps to explore 
the role of institutions in constructivism, since international (including regional) 
institutions act as promoters and sites of socialization. The second section highlights the 
insights generated by constructivist scholarship on Asian regional institutions. The third 
section considers the contribution of Asian regional institutions to socialization, one of 
the most important conceptual tools of constructivism (Johnston 2007). This section 
addresses the specific question of whether regional institutions in Asia have created the 
possibility of socializing the behavior of states, and to what extent the motivations and 
conditions of socialization as specified by constructivist theory have played out in the 
region and shaped its regional institutions. 
 
At the outset, let me note some limitations of this essay. I write this assessment of 
constructivist scholarship on Asian institutions from “within the camp,” hence subject to 
the presumptions and biases that come with this predicament. Second, my coverage of 
constructivist contributions to the study of Asian regionalism is not exhaustive. Although 
relatively new, the body of writings on Asian regionalism that is explicitly or implicitly 
constructivist is growing in number and diversity. I have drawn mainly upon those that 
are directly relevant to my investigation into the socializing effect of regional institutions. I 
do not include constructivist studies that are not concerned with institutions and 
socialization, such as those which focus primarily on domestic politics (e.g., Japan’s anti-
militaristic norm, the emergence of a Taipei,China identity), bilateral relations (e.g., the 
alliance between the United States [US] and the Republic of Korea, or relations between 
the People’s Republic of China [PRC] and Taipei,China), or the foreign policy or 
strategic behavior of individual states (e.g.,  Johnston’s study [1998] of the PRC’s   
“cultural realism”). Next, with some exceptions (like its attention to epistemic 
communities), the essay is state-centric, even though it need not be so. Constructivist 
accounts can fully accommodate the role of both states and civil society actors (not just 
Track-II bodies) in regional cooperation. But consistent with the mandate given to this 
author, I have accepted here as a fair assumption that Asian regional institutions, 
reflecting the domestic politics of many states, are primarily inter-governmental 
organizations, even though their ideational (as opposed to material) resources derive 
from epistemic communities as much as states. It is in relation to state behavior that 
their impact must be primarily judged, even though regional institutions are increasingly 
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2.  Constructivism in International Relations Theory 
 
Constructivism is a relatively new perspective on international relations. Although some 
trace its genesis to the work of the English School of international relations beginning in 
the 1950s, it emerged as a distinctive label in the late 1980s and acquired growing 
popularity in the 1990s (Hopf 1998; Checkel 1998a, 1998b). Today, some would see it 
as having acquired a status (and a dominance) comparable to realism and liberalism, 
although this would be stretching the truth, except perhaps in Europe. There are 
vigorous academic debates over what constructivism stands for and whether it’s a full-
fledged or substantive theory (like realism, liberalism, or institutionalism) or a meta-
theory, a philosophical position and an ontology that does not offer causal arguments 
that are falsifiable and testable (Moravcsik 2001, Risse and Wiener 2001). In the latter 
view, constructivism, like rational choice, is more of a method than a theory per se. 
(Checkel 1998a, 1998b). There are significant differences between American Wendtian 
constructivism, which tends to be social-scientific, or “softly rational,” as Ernst Haas 
(2001) put it, and a European variety which stresses argumentative rationality and leans 
more towards reflectivism (Christiansen, Jorgensen, and Wiener 2001). There may even 
be a possible Asian strand distinguished by claims of regional exceptionalism: the 
uniqueness of Asian culture and tradition as the basis of its international relations (Kang 
2003) and constitutive localization of ideas and norms (Acharya 2004, 2009). Moreover, 
although its initial popularity was due to its claim to challenge rationalist (neo-realist and 
neo-liberal) theories, there is a growing consensus that these and the constructivist 
perspective are complimentary rather than antithetical. Hence, the growing talk about a 
rationalist–constructivist synthesis (Checkel 2005).   
 
Notwithstanding these debates, it is fair to say that constructivism makes some 
fundamental claims about the nature of international relations which set it apart from 
other theories including realism and liberalism. Five are especially noteworthy.  
   
The first is that agents (e.g., states) and structures (the international system) are 
mutually constitutive. This goes against structuralist theories, such as neo-realism, which 
hold that state behavior is determined by structure (i.e., anarchy, or the absence of a 
higher authority above the state) and the distribution of power (e.g., bipolarity, 
multipolarity). For structural perspectives, unit-level variables (domestic politics, 
democracy, and autocracy), human nature (good or bad leaders), and the action of 
agents (norm entrepreneurs, including civil society groups) are not decisive in shaping 
conflict and cooperation. Constructivists, on the other hand, believe that states, leaders, 
transnational moral agents, and civil society groups affect the international system and 
are shaped by it. 
 
Second, constructivism argues that the interests and identities of actors (states) are not 
a given, or preordained, but are shaped by their interactions with other actors. To quote 
the title of Wendt’s  (1992) classic essay, “anarchy is what states make of it”. This 
challenges the rationalist logic of theories that hold that states already “know who they 
are and what they want” before they enter into international interactions. 
 
A third claim of constructivism is that international relations is shaped not just by material 
forces, but also by ideational ones, including culture, ideas, and norms. Constructivism Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for Socializing the Behavior of States    |       3 
 
has been a major factor in the return of culture and identity to the study of international 
relations, after it became unfashionable in the West as a result the behavioral revolution. 
Constructivists have taken up the study of cultural determinants of foreign policy, 
security, and economics, with the best known examples being The Culture of National 
Security,  a collection of essays linking culture and security issues  edited by Peter 
Katzenstein (1996), and Iain Johnston’s Cultural Realism (1998), which examined the 
cultural determinants of the PRC’s strategic behavior. Few constructivists would claim 
exclusive causality for ideas, but many would argue, following Wendt (1999), that in 
explaining international relations, one should turn to ideas first and then turn to material 
forces to explain residual phenomena. It is fair to say that many followers of 
constructivism see it is an “ideas-first”, rather than “ideas-all-the-way-down” theory. 
Others give ideas at least equal space. Moreover, constructivists do not see ideas as 
mere hooks for strategic action or self-interested behavior aimed at achieving parochial 
goals, but as instruments of normative action that can transform international relations.   
 
This leads to a fourth key argument of constructivism concerning the transformative 
effects of norms. Constructivists (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 1998a, 1998b; 
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999) believe that states are guided by a logic of 
appropriateness, rather than by a logic of consequences (or consequentialism). Norms 
play a crucial role in deciding what is legitimate and appropriate, and what is not. Norms 
matter; they can and do trump power- and interest-driven behavior. Norms can tame or 
constrain power politics by delegitimizing it (Acharya 2009). Once accepted, norms 
develop a sticky quality and tend to reproduce themselves. Norms help the socialization 
of new actors into a community.  
 
Finally, constructivism takes a deeper view of the impact of international institutions. 
Institutions are central to the constructivist view of international relations. Realists often 
dismiss international institutions as marginal to the game of international politics, some 
consider them as adjuncts to power-balancing behavior. Institutions are as good as their 
great power patrons want them to be. Liberals see international institutions as having a 
more meaningful role. Classical liberalism stressed the collective security function of 
international institutions. A more recent strand of liberalism, neo-liberal institutionalism 
(Keohane 1989), while regarding the international system as anarchic (thus agreeing 
with neo-realism), nonetheless finds cooperation to be possible because institutions 
promote transparency (information flows), reduce transaction costs, and discourage 
cheating. Constructivists have significantly redefined and broadened the neo-liberal 
institutionalist perspective on how institutions work by moving away from its contractual 
view of cooperation based on reciprocity and rational calculation of cost and benefit. 
According to constructivist theory, international institutions, formal and informal, act as 
teachers of norms (Finnemore 1993) and provide an environment for socialization 
(Johnston 2001), in which “actors internalize the norms which then influence how they 
see themselves and what they perceive as their interests.” (Risse and Wiener 2001, 
202). Instead of strategic calculation, the constructivist view of how institutions work 
focuses on the micro-processes of persuasion and social influence. Constructivists thus 
argue that international institutions not only regulate state behavior, they also have a 
constitutive effect on states, meaning institutions can change state interests and 
reconstitute their identities. Together with norms, institutions can transform anarchy and 4          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 82 
 
 
push a group of states onto a path towards security communities in which war among 
states become unthinkable (Adler and Barnett 1998).  
 
Recent non-Western, including Asian, contributions to the constructivist view of 
international institutions have moved it beyond its origins within a Western discourse and 
context. Two lines of advance can be discerned. The first is that international institutions 
may matter even if they are not fully backed by the great powers or when they are led by 
weak states in the face of great power indifference or opposition. Unlike realism, which is 
a theory of the weak in the world of the strong, constructivism offers a theory of the 
strong in the world of the weak. Weak states resorting to norm-based action and working 
through cooperative institutions can resist the material hegemony of great powers and 
influence power politics (Acharya 2009). Second, constructivism, even more so than 
regime theory, offers a way of understanding why states cooperate even in the absence 
of strong formalistic, legalistic institutions like the European Union (EU). Constructivism 
focuses on the transformative and constitutive role of ideas and norms, which can be 
diffused and shared with or without formal organizations with large, permanent 
bureaucracies (Acharya 1997, 2009).  
 
Constructivism not only describes a worldview with conditions for peaceful change, it 
also has a prescriptive function that includes specifying strategies of change induced by 
socialization. As Johnston (2007, xvi) argues, “there is also a great deal of policy space 
for socialization arguments. After all, governmental and non-governmental diplomacy is 
often an effort to persuade, shame, cajole, and socially ‘pressure’ states to change their 
collective minds and behavior.”  Some of the key documents of Asian regionalism reflect 
a constructivist logic of socialization (Severino 2006, East Asia Vision Group 2001, East 
Asia Study Group 2002).  Strategies of socialization, constructivism’s signature 
contribution to international relations theory and practice, is an approach employed by 
states in opposition to realpolitik approaches of engagement such as balancing, 
bandwagoning, or buck-passing. Socialization is a way of generating counter-realpolitik 
behavior in states that are being socialized. 
 
 
3.  Constructivism and the Study of Asian Regionalism 
 
It is useful to remind ourselves that Asian regionalism as a distinctive field of study is 
remarkably new, and that until recently, it had remained largely atheoretical. The study 
of Asian regionalism has in recent years become increasingly theoretical. This essay 
argues that constructivist approaches, or studies underpinned by constructivist 
assumptions as identified earlier, have made a number of important contributions to the 
study of Asian regional institutions.  
 
The first concerns the question of regional definition. Challenging the traditional 
geographic and geopolitical view of regions, constructivists argue that the there can be 
no preordained, permanent or changeless regions. Regions are social constructs, whose 
boundaries are subject to negotiation and change. Such characterizations apply whether 
one is speaking of Southeast Asia, which has been likened to an “imagined community” 
(Acharya 2000), or the larger East Asia (Evans 1999) and Asia-Pacific regions. As 
Pempel (2005, 24–25) put it, while “East Asia today is a much more closely knit region Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for Socializing the Behavior of States    |       5 
 
than it was at the end of World War II or even a decade ago…no single map of East Asia 
is so inherently self-evident and logical as to preclude the consideration of equally 
plausible alternatives.” It should be noted that critical international relations scholars also 
challenge regional definitions as givens. Dirlik (1992) for example characterized the 
“Asia-Pacific idea” as a matter more of representation than reality: an artificial construct 
that rationalizes elite interests. Constructivists do not necessarily share such skepticism 
about regional construction and identity. Neither do they agree on the question of 
whether regions are constructed from within or from without. But unlike realists who 
often think of regions as extensions of great power geopolitics, constructivism makes 
greater allowance for the bottom-up construction of regions.  
 
This leads to a second insight of constructivist analysis of Asian regional institutions: 
how they differ from the European variety. This debate has acquired a huge following 
thanks to European-funded projects and conferences. But the most insightful 
contribution to this debate comes from a constructivist scholar (admittedly with an 
eclectic perspective that combines power and interest variables with ideational ones): 
Peter Katzenstein. Katzenstein (2005) argues that regionalism in both Europe and Asia 
is shaped by US-led processes of globalization and internationalization, and are 
underpinned by regional production structures led by a “core state” serving US interests: 
Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia. But while Europe’s regionalism is much more 
institutionalized, legalized, and marked by supranational governance, Asia’s is late, 
sovereignty bound, informal, and non-legalistic. The reason for this has to do not only 
with differing domestic structures (Asia’s non-Weberian polities versus Europe’s 
Weberian ones), but also—and this is the constructivist element in his contribution—with 
international norms, such as Asia’s adherence to the norm of “open regionalism,” and 
variations in identification. While Katzenstein’s position on core states has not gone 
unchallenged (Aggarwal  et al. 2007), especially from those who argue, among other 
things, that the characterization of Japanese dominance in Asian regional production 
structures is rapidly becoming anachronistic in the face of a rising PRC, he does address 
one of the key puzzles of Asian regional institutionalism: why did post-War Asia not 
develop a multilateral institution? While realists explain the puzzle by pointing to the 
“extreme hegemony” of the US in the early post-war period as a factor inhibiting 
multilateralism, and liberals do so by pointing to the region’s initial lack of economic 
interdependence, constructivists point to the role of identity and norms. For Katzenstein, 
US perceptions of a greater collective identity with its European partners as a community 
of equals led it to encourage North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-like 
multilateralism in Europe; the absence of such identification and the perception of Asia 
as an inferior community led it to shun multilateralism there (Katzenstein 2005, Hemmer 
and Katzenstein 2002). Another constructivist explanation looks beyond the US–Asia 
identity dissonance and argues that the late development of Asian multilateralism could 
be explained in terms of the normative beliefs and preferences of Asian actors against 
great-power-led security multilateralism (Acharya 2009).  
 
Third, constructivism has done much to highlight the specific and unique design features 
of Asian institutions. The literature on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and the so-called “ASEAN way,” which is authored largely by constructivist 
scholars, identifies the informal, non-legalistic, consensus-based, and process-driven 
approach to coordination and collaboration developed by ASEAN (Acharya 1997, Busse 6          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 82 
 
 
1999, Nischalke 2000, Haacke 2003, Caballero-Anthony 2005). These design features 
of ASEAN have also been grafted onto the wider Asia-Pacific institutions such as Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Aside 
from defining the latter’s institutional characteristics, ASEAN’s design features also 
underscore its role as the driver of these wider institutions. There has been much debate 
as to whether the ASEAN way has always been upheld in practice. But what is clear is 
that it has come under increasing strain in recent years as ASEAN and other institutions 
face new transnational challenges such as financial crises, pandemics, and terrorism. 
ASEAN is under growing pressure to legalize itself and has responded to these 
pressures by drafting and adopting an ASEAN Charter. Some of the institutional 
mechanisms of ASEAN, such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area and Agreement on 
Transboundary Pollution, show increasing legalization. APEC’s move towards 
legalization is also worth noting, although this has stalled as a result of the setbacks to 
its trade liberalization program. The ARF remains weakly institutionalized and severely 
under-legalized. Its confidence-building agenda is based on voluntary efforts, and its 
development of a preventive diplomacy and mediation role has stalled.  
 
A fourth insight of constructivism into Asian regionalism concerns the role of ideas and 
epistemic communities (non-official or semiofficial transnational expert groups) in the 
development of regional institutions, especially APEC. It is true that the leading figures of 
the Pacific Cooperation movement were neoclassical economists and economic liberals 
(Woods 1993). But their role in first developing the Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Council (PECC) and subsequently APEC cannot be understood without applying a 
constructivist perspective on the role of knowledge or epistemic communities. Although 
not strictly a constructivist work, John Ravenhill’s (2001) study of APEC takes a 
composite approach to examine both the material as well as the ideational sources of 
APEC. He puts the role of knowledge groups—especially the advocates of the Pacific 
Community idea in the 1970s and 80s, who were deeply involved in PECC as the 
precursor to APEC—and their ideas (open regionalism) alongside the distribution of 
power, interdependence, and domestic politics as the mix of forces that produced APEC. 
In this respect, his book differs from rationalist accounts of APEC’s emergence 
(Drysdale 1988, Kahler 1994, Aggarwal 1993, Aggarwal and Morrison 1998). The role of 
the ASEAN Institutes of International and Strategic Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) and the 
Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in developing policy 
proposals and serving as a filter of ideas for ASEAN and the ARF are similar testimony 
to the role of epistemic communities in fostering cooperation and institution-building 
(Caballero-Anthony 2005; for a radical constructivist view of these epistemic 
communities, see Tan 2007). 
 
The fifth contribution concerns the role of ASEAN, the first truly viable regional institution 
in Asia. Here, Acharya ([2001] 2009), Haacke (2003), Caballero-Anthony (2005), and Ba 
(2009) have each made well-known constructivist contributions to the understanding of 
ASEAN. Their relative focus differs, however. The author’s book (Acharya 2001) uses 
the concept of a “security community,” or a group of states which rule out the use of 
force in resolving their conflicts, originally developed by Karl Deutsch and his associates, 
and reformulated by Adler and Barnett (1998) as an analytical tool to examine ASEAN’s 
strengths as well as limitations. Despite its stated intention to stay away from the 
question of ASEAN’s current status as a security community, the book has fuelled a Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for Socializing the Behavior of States    |       7 
 
heated controversy precisely over the question of whether ASEAN should or should not 
be regarded as a pluralistic security community. And while the author’s work places strong 
emphasis on norms and local agency, others like Ba, give more play to the socialization involving 
external actors. Haacke’s idea of diplomatic and security culture is essentially 
constructivist, albeit influenced by Michael Leifer’s (Haacke’s doctoral supervisor) soft 
realism, while Ba avoids the security community debate and employs an ideational and 
“social negotiations” (e.g., dialogues, meetings) approach to trace the evolution of 
ASEAN’s norms and its extension to East Asian great powers (the PRC and Japan).  
 
Despite these differences, they share a fit with constructivist assumptions in the 
following respects. First, they highlight the role of ideational forces—norms, identity, 
community, and strategic culture—in the origin and evolution of ASEAN. Ideational 
assets are key in explaining ASEAN’s emergence and effectiveness: 
 
The role of norms and identity-building is especially important for the study of 
Southeast Asian regionalism because its material resources and bureaucratic 
organization are thin indeed. ASEAN regionalism has been primarily a normative 
regionalism. Hence, no serious investigation of ASEAN can be complete without 
consideration of the role of norms and the issue of identity-formation. For the 
same reason, the concept of community is an important analytic tool for 
investigating Southeast Asian regionalism and regional order. This is because 
the notion of security community allows the use of norms and identity as analytic 
tools to investigate international relations, while neo-realism or neo-liberalism 
would ignore such variables. (Acharya 2005)  
 
Other shared threads among constructivist works on ASEAN are their investigations into 
ASEAN’s constraining impact on inter-state conflicts and great power behavior, and the 
strengths and limits of ASEAN’s informal regionalism, including the extension of the 
ASEAN model to East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. In these respects, these contributions 
dissent from Michael Leifer’s soft realist account of ASEAN (Leifer 1989),  or Shaun 
Narine’s (2002) essentially realist account, although his subsequent work on ASEAN has 
embraced the English School’s international society perspective. Much of the above 
constructivist work concerns ASEAN’s political and security cooperation. There has not 
yet been a significant constructivist account of ASEAN economic cooperation to match 
Nesadurai’s (2003) domestic-politics-centered account of trade liberalization. 
 
Sixth, constructivism has done much to explain the emergence, activities, and 
performance of wider Asia-Pacific and East Asian regional institutions. Initial work on this 
started as an extension of research on ASEAN, which is not surprising since ASEAN has 
been the institutional hub (and sometimes the driver) of Asia-Pacific and East Asian 
regionalism. Here, constructivists’ accounts (Acharya 1997, Ba 2009, Johnston 1999) 
have explored the benefits and pitfalls of extending the ASEAN process (or ASEAN way) 
to Asia-Pacific regionalism by asking whether a sub-regionally developed approach can 
work in such a larger and more complex setting involving so many great powers. 
Constructivists generally believe that it can.  
 
Constructivists (Acharya 2003) believe that the major contribution of Asian institutions is 
normative. Asian institutions act as sites of normative contestation, creation (i.e., “norm 8          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 82 
 
 
breweries” to use Katsumata’s [2006] term, and localization. While Asian regionalism is 
influenced by global norms, these norms are not imported wholesale, but are localized 
by regional actors to suit their own context and need, in accordance with their prior 
beliefs and practices. Thus, the usefulness and relevance of these normative discourses 
carried through regional institutions is enhanced by such “constitutive localization” 
(Acharya 2004). A related and subsequent line of investigation concerns the socializing 
effects of security institutions, particularly the ARF. Iain Johnston’s Social States (2007), 
not strictly a study of Asian regionalism, but of the PRC’s participation in international 
institutions during 1980–2000, cautiously argues in support of the ARF’s influence in 
inducing more cooperative behavior from the PRC. Katsumata (2009) is far more 
forthright in claiming that the ARF has had a substantial impact on the strategic 
preferences and behavior of the PRC, Japan, and the US, the three principal powers of 
the Asia-Pacific. This would certainly add to a particularly contentious ongoing debate 
over the ARF triggered by Leifer’s (1996) skeptical view, which pointed to what he terms 
the ARF’s “structural flaw”: the professed goal of a group of weak states (ASEAN) to 
manage the balance of power in a region which contains practically all the great powers 
of the international system. The ARF in his view can at best be an adjunct to the balance 
of power game played by the great powers; instead of influencing it, it will be influenced 
by it. Moreover, the success of ARF depends on a prior balance of power, by which he 
meant an equitable distribution of power. On the other side of the debate are 
constructivists who have turned the balance of power logic on its head by arguing that 
norm-guided socialization led by ASEAN’s weaker states can actually shape great power 
geopolitics and that the restraint induced by the ARF is key to maintaining a stable 
balance of power in the region. This theme is also captured by Ralf Emmers’ (2003) 
study of ARF which represents an attempt to reconcile realism and institutionalism. 
 
 
4. Socialization  and  Asian Regional Institutions  
 
This leads us to a discussion of the socializing role of Asian regional institutions, the 
principal theme of this essay. What evidence is there that Asian institutions have had a 
role in socialization and how effective have they been in socializing their member states? 
To consider this meaningfully, we must first have an understanding of what socialization 
means, what are its causal mechanisms, how to we measure the success or failure of 
socialization, and what are the conditions that determine the success or failure of 
socialization mechanisms.   
 
In a broad and simple sense, socialization means getting new actors to adopt the rules 
and norms of a community on a long-term basis without the use of force or coercion. 
There are four key aspects to this definition. First and foremost, socialization’s key 
ingredient is norms.  Socialization implies norm transmission by socializers resulting in 
pro-norm behavior by the socializee. Risse (1997, 16) emphasizes processes “resulting 
in the internalization of norms so that they assume their ‘taken-for-granted’ nature” as 
the core aspect of socialization; while Ikenberry and Kupchan  (1990, 289–90) define 
socialization as a process of learning in which the norms and ideals are transmitted by 
one party to another. Second, for constructivists, such norm transmission that underlies 
socialization is pacific and non-coercive. There is no socialization through force or 
conquest, the key mechanism of socialization is persuasion. Third, socialization is Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for Socializing the Behavior of States    |       9 
 
directed at newcomers, or novices. Fourth, socialization leads to long-term and stable 
changes in behavior, rather than short-term adaptation. Checkel’s definition of 
socialization which draws upon previous writings on the subject, including sociological 
perspectives, is useful to borrow. Socialization is: 
 
defined as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given 
community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the norms and rules 
of a given community. In adopting community rules, socialization implies that an 
agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent 
from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions. (Checkel 2005, 
804) 
 
To clarify, this essay views socialization itself as a dependent variable, i.e., getting new 
actors to follow the rules of the group, rather than attainment of peace and prosperity. 
Judging socialization is different from judging the instrumental efficacy of institutions. 
 
The insights of the constructivist literature on socialization can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
(i)  Whereas previous works on socialization focused more on the 
motivations and role of “socializers,” more recent works (especially 
Johnston 2007; Acharya 2004, 2009), investigate it from the perspective 
of the “socializee” or the norm-taker. In other words, in understanding 
socialization, it is more important to understand the domestic and external 
conditions of the socializee/persuadee/ norm-taker than that of the 
socializer/persuader/norm-giver.   
 
(ii)  International institutions play a vital role in socialization, whether as 
promoters of socialization from outside or as sites of socialization in 
cases when the socializee is a member of the institution. 
 
(iii)  There is no one pathway to socialization. Mechanisms of socialization can 
include strategic calculation (whereby the target actor calculates that the 
benefits of socialization exceed its costs) and bargaining, as well as 
persuasion, teaching, mimicking, social influence, argumentation, role 
playing, or normative suasion. The shift to a logic of appropriateness is 
not necessarily a shift to what is morally appropriate, but to what is 
socially appropriate, from a calculation of what is instrumentally beneficial 
to the socializee (logic of consequences). 
 
(iv)  The dependent variable of socialization (when socialization has taken 
place) is internalization of “the values, roles, and understandings held by 
a group that constitutes the society of which the actor becomes a 
member. Internalization implies, further, that these values, roles, and 
understandings take on the character of ‘taken-for-grantedness’” 
(Johnston 2007, 21). The degree of internalization may vary, however. 
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interests and identities of the target, sometimes, the target may agree to 
play by the rules of the group it is being inducted without developing a 
“we feeing.” Checkel distinguishes between Type I socialization, where 
the socializee has accepted new roles out of instrumental calculations 
(incentive-based) in order to conform to the expectations of a community 
it seeks to belong to without necessarily liking or agreeing with it, and 
Type II socialization, where genuine and long-term (taken for granted) 
changes to the interests and values of the socializee have occurred, and 
where new roles and behavioral changes reflect a new normative 
conception that “it’s the right thing to do” (Checkel 2005, 808 and 813).  
 
(v)  Socialization depends on a number of conditions. Zurn and Checkel’s 
(2005, 1055) list of scope conditions of socialization includes properties of 
the international institutions that trigger socialization, properties of the 
political systems and agents that become socialized, properties of the 
issues or norms regarding which type of socialization takes place, and 
properties of the interaction between socializing and socialized agents 
(e.g., intensity of contact, style of discourse). A more selective and 
specific set of hypotheses about socialization may be derived from the 
literature on persuasion, an important mechanism or “micro process” of 
socialization (Checkel and Moravcsik 2001, Checkel 2005). According to 
this literature, persuasion is more likely to succeed if the (a) target actors 
are in a new and uncertain environment, (b) prior and ingrained beliefs of 
the persuadee do not clash with the beliefs and messages of the 
persuader, (c) persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to 
which the persuadee wishes to belong, (d) persuader itself sets the 
example and acts out the principles of deliberative argument and, (e) 
interaction occurs in a setting that is relatively less politicized or more 
insulated from public opinion and pressure (i.e., “in-camera setting”).  For 
a more extensive list of the scope conditions, albeit generalized out of 
European cases, see Checkel 2005, 813; Zurn and Checkel 2005. Other 
determinants of socialization include group size, intensity, and frequency 
of contact, and shared identity among the persuader and the persuadee. 
 
How do these conditions apply to Asian regionalism? This essay focuses on three main 
cases of socialization through regional institutions in Asia: Viet Nam, the PRC, and 
India.
1   These three cases are discussed below in terms of the insights of the 
socialization literature outlined above.  
 
                                                 
1   One might plausibly include the US here, but I have kept the US out on grounds of regional belonging 
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Table 1: Key Norms of Asian Regional Institutions 
 




Pacific settlement of disputes; 
Primacy of regional solutions; 
Avoidance of multilateral 
military pacts reflecting great 







interference, avoidance of 
NATO-style military 
cooperation 














APEC = Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ARF = ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
The first area to look at concerns the socializee’s imperative. In each of these cases, the 
changing domestic conditions (including regime legitimacy and survival) of the target 
have been critical. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the PRC (inspired by domestic economic 
pressure, ideological shift, regime insecurity, and a desire to restore the PRC’s standing 
in the world) beginning in the late 1970s; Viet  Nam’s withdrawal from Cambodia 
(induced by domestic economic failure earlier in the 1980s created by the burden of its 
occupation of Cambodia); and India’s crisis-induced (a severe balance of payments 
crisis and near default on foreign debt) liberalization in the early 1990s paved the way for 
critical foreign policy shifts leading to their eventual membership in regional institutions. 
External conditions, especially the end of the Cold War have also been a critical factor, 
but not sufficient by themselves to explain why these countries chose to be socialized, 
since the end of the Cold War did not generate similar responses from the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Moreover, the socialization of the three states did 
not begin simultaneously; Viet Nam’s was first and perhaps the most advanced, the 
PRC’s was second in sequence, followed by India. And the socializations of the PRC 
and India have not progressed to the same extent. Hence, domestic conditions and the 
preferences of the socializee, is the more important variable here, rather than the 
singular external event (i.e., end of the Cold War).    
 
The second area is the role of institutions, especially regional ones. There is little doubt 
that regional institutions have been critical in the socialization process, both before and 
after the target states became formal members. While ASEAN has been the most 
important institution for Viet Nam, the ARF has been especially important for the PRC. 
For India, the prospect of becoming an ASEAN dialogue partner and a member of the 
ARF and East Asian Summit (EAS) has been similarly important. Once the target states 
became members, regional institutions became sites of dialogues, rule-making, and 
creation of new mechanisms of cooperation. 
 
The third area, which concerns the issue of strategic calculation versus 
persuasion/argumentation/social influence, is especially important. No one can exclude 12          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 82 
 
 
strategic calculation on the part of the three states in engaging and being engaged by 
these institutions. For Viet Nam, membership in ASEAN offered an opportunity to attract 
foreign investment, even before the ASEAN Free Trade Area and ASEAN Investment 
Area, and a platform to cushion its reentry into the international system after a decade of 
isolation due to its occupation of Cambodia. It also meant diplomatic support (albeit 
implicit and limited) for its territorial claim (Spratlys and Paracels) against the PRC in the 
sense that its bilateral dispute with the PRC now became a PRC–ASEAN issue. For the 
PRC, the strategic calculation in joining the ARF, despite substantial misgivings, would 
have been the opportunity afforded by the ARF as a platform to launch a charm 
offensive and reduce perceptions of the “[People’s Republic of] China threat.” 
Neutralizing Taipei,China’s influence-seeking in Southeast Asia through trade and 
investment was also important.  For India, improving its then-dismal economic 
conditions, having ASEAN as a bridge with its prosperous East Asian neighbors, and 
engaging in strategic competition with the PRC were important motivations that a 
rationalist framework would easily recognize. 
 
But as noted, constructivists accept that norm compliance and socialization is not 
inconsistent with self-interested behavior.  The key is whether what we are witnessing is 
pacific, long-term, and transformative (in the sense that they involve a redefinition of 
interests and identities, and not simply short-term adaptation and reluctant role-playing). 
The jury is still out on this question. But certain important indicators of internalization are 
visible in each case in which regional institutions have played an important role, whether 
as external promoters or sites of socialization. 
 
Turning to Viet Nam first, there is considerable evidence that Viet Nam has accepted 
and internalized ASEAN’s non-intervention norm, in contrast to its past disregard and 
violation of the norm, evident in its support for communist movements in neighboring 
Southeast Asian states, its grand scheme of an Indochinese federation dominated by 
itself, and its invasion and occupation of Cambodia. In the case of the PRC, the key 
change has been the shift from an exclusively bilateral approach to conflict management 
to a multilateral approach. This is evident in its acceptance of multilateral talks with 
ASEAN on the South China Sea dispute leading to a Declaration on the Code of 
Conduct in the South China Sea (not yet a full-fledged legal instrument or code, but an 
important step towards it; further progress towards such a code will be a key test of its 
internalization of multilateralism norm). The PRC’s growing support for the ARF despite 
earlier misgivings about it is also important. The author’s research offers a graphic 
account of the conceptual shift in Chinese thinking on multilateralism in the 1990s. 
Johnston (2007) provides considerable evidence of changes to Chinese bureaucratic 
and decision-making structures that support the internalization of new norms of 
multilateralism. As for India, the key change is in the economic arena as evident in 
India’s gradual shift from economic nationalism and protectionism to trade liberalization, 
openness, and foreign direct investment. Again, this shift is occurring (albeit haltingly) 
not just because of regional institutions, but regional institutions have provided key sites 
for the change, including negotiations over the ASEAN– India Free Trade Agreement 
and India’s own interest in developing an Asian Free Trade Area (as well as prospective 
membership in APEC, as yet unrealized but an incentive for accepting free trade 
liberalization norms). What is striking about India’s membership in ASEAN, ARF, and 
EAS is that unlike the 1940s and 1950s, when India was the leading provider of Asian Asian Regional Institutions and the Possibilities for Socializing the Behavior of States    |       13 
 
regionalist ideas and a key force behind Asian multilateral conferences—such as the 
Asian Relations Conference of 1947 and 1949, and the Asia-Africa Conference of 
1955—it is now following someone else’s (ASEAN) lead in regionalism. 
 
These instances of internalization (as indicator of socialization) have their limits. The 
PRC does not accept a preventive diplomacy role (signifying deeper multilateralism) for 
the ARF, or resorting to multilateralism in addressing the Taipei,China issue, and India is 
not yet a full convert to free trading with East Asian countries, or to multilateralism in 
resolving the Kashmir conflict. But while not comprehensive, their normative and 
behavioral shifts are irreversible. There is no going back to the Indochinese federation 
for Viet Nam, exclusive bilateralism for the PRC, or Nehruvian socialism for India. And it 
is fair to say that these shifts were induced by socialization through regional institutions, 
although not exclusively by them. Regional institutions have helped to create and 
reinforce the convergence between domestic interests, strategic calculation, and 
international behavior. 
 
The evidence seen thus far suggests the possibility of a Type III internalization, in 
addition to Checkel’s Type I (states acting in accordance with group expectations 
“irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it”), and Type II in which there is 
real value and interest change leading agents to “adopt the interests, or even possibly 
the identity, of the community of which they are a part” (Checkel 2005, 804). In either 
case, instrumental calculation, which may be initially present as a mechanism of 
socialization, has been replaced by a logic of appropriateness. Although Checkel calls 
for a “double interpretation” of every instance of socialization, once from the perspective 
of constructivism and once from the perspective of rational choice, he is quite clear on 
what socialization entails: in order to be socialized, whether into a Type I or a Type II 
outcome, states must discard instrumental calculation (logic of consequences) in favor of 
logic of appropriateness (Checkel 2005, 804). By contrast, this author suggests a Type 
III internalization to refer to a condition in which agents act both instrumentally and 
normatively, concurrently, and on a more or less permanent basis. Moreover, in Type III 
internalization a key factor in determining the outcome may be the logic of expediency. 
Creating a room for states to determine their own pace within regional institutions and 
agreements is an important enabler for Type III internalization, in which states act both 
instrumentally and normatively, concurrently, and to support regional cooperation and 
integration. In this situation, states tend to pursue new initiatives or new directions at a 
pace comfortable to all stakeholders. Yet this is no short-term shift from purely 
instrumental calculation and behavior, the shift is irreversible, even though it may or may 
not lead to Type II internalization, in which values and interests change permanently.  
 
Type III internalization is what best describes the socializing effects of Asian regional 
institutions today on newcomers. While the socializee (the PRC, India, Viet Nam) are not 
in danger of backtracking, they need more time and convincing before fully committing to 
the new norms and roles to an extent where interest and identity transformation 
becomes discernable. And they may never get to that stage. In other words, Type III 
internalization may or may not be an intermediary stage or the tipping point between 
Type I and Type II. Moreover, Type III internalization may not be comprehensive in 
terms of issue areas. Viet Nam, the PRC, and India have all irrevocably committed to 
non-interference, multilateralism, and trade regionalism, respectively, but they have not 14          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 82 
 
 
embraced all three areas, at least to the same degree. Uneven socialization and 
internalization is thus a feature of Type III socialization. 
 
Finally, the conditions of socialization are important in answering the question of why 
internalization, even if to such limited degree, has taken place in Asia. Of the five 
conditions outlined above, the new and uncertain strategic and economic environment of 
the post-Cold War era has certainly been an important factor; Khong (2004) has argued 
that the principal mission of Asian regional institutions has been to reduce and manage 
uncertainty. Uncertainty—about the US military posture, the rise of the PRC and its 
strategic intent and behavior, competition between the PRC and Japan, the appearance 
of regional trade blocs due to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
the EU’s Single Market—was the key element of the security discourse of the post-Cold 
War period. It certainly helped to focus the purpose and direction of Asia’s regional 
institutions. The second condition is consistent with this essay’s norm localization 
argument, which suggests that norm diffusion is more likely to be successful if it is 
congruent with the prior beliefs and practices of the norm-taker. Since norms are 
important to socialization, it is important to recognize that certain norms promoted by 
external players (e.g., Australia, Canada, Gorbachev’s former Soviet Union), such as 
open regionalism in the economic arena and cooperative security in the security arena, 
have been accepted in Asia (by ASEAN states and the PRC) because they were 
congruent (or made to appear as such by norm entrepreneurs from Canada and 
Australia) with the prior beliefs and practices of the local actors, which included ASEAN’s 
prior multilateralism and its openness to foreign direct investment. By contrast, norms of 
humanitarian intervention and EU-style free trade failed to diffuse in East Asia because 
of their clash with prior local norms of non-intervention and developmental regionalism 




Table 2: Types of Socialization (Internalization) 
 




To be socially accepted by 
satisfying group 
expectations 
Because “it’s the right 
thing to do” 
 
To be socially accepted by 
finding the best fit between 
self-interest and group 
purpose 
      
Indicator of 
internalization 
Learning and playing new 
roles even when the agent 
may not like it or agree with 
it  
 
Changes in interests and 
identities that can be 
“taken for granted”  
 
Learning new roles that it 
agrees with, with some 
redefinition of its interests 
and identities 
Logic of action  Logic of appropriateness  Logic of appropriateness  Logic of consequences and 
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The third condition is also relevant in Asia; ASEAN, as the chief forum for socialization, 
had an aura of authoritativeness (at least before the 1997/98 financial crisis), which 
made it attractive for the PRC, India, and Viet Nam to participate in ASEAN-led regional 
institutions. This authoritativeness had to do with ASEAN’s relative longevity (the oldest 
viable regional political grouping in Asia), its role in the Cambodia peace process, its 
own intra-mural peace, and its system of dialogue relationships with the major powers. 
ASEAN had also shown both willingness and ability to act out its own norms of non-
intervention and non-use of force (notwithstanding the fact that the meaning of non-
intervention remains contested here, as ASEAN has supported fellow regimes facing 
internal threats and this particular norm is now subject to increasing challenge). Its 
authority as a socializer is also the result of the fact that no other country or group of 
countries in Asia are in a similar position to provide leadership due to their past failures 
(India), mutual rivalry (PRC–Japan), smallness and security preoccupations (Republic of 
Korea), or outsider-ness (US, Australia, Canada, and Russian Federation).  
 
The centrality of ASEAN in Asian regionalism also raises the question of the content of 
norms as a condition for socialization. In the European context, the examples of such 
norms which are often cited as conditions of socialization are minority rights or 
democratic procedures (Zurn and Checkel 2005, 1055). In Asia, the norms that most 
influence socialization are not those of human rights or democracy, but domestic non-
interference and regional autonomy. Without the centrality of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of states espoused by ASEAN, it is unlikely that the PRC or Viet Nam 
(or Myanmar) would have been drawn into APEC, ARF, and EAS. Its sister norm is non-
intervention by outside powers in regional affairs, or regional autonomy, and the intent to 
explore indigenous solutions to regional problems. This, coupled with the related 
tendency to localize foreign norms to suit regional context and need in accordance with 
prior beliefs and practices, has not been that crucial in Europe, but is of considerable 
salience in Asia’s post-colonial context, even though it does not imply the exclusion of 
outside powers from the region. 
 
Last but not the least, is the final condition of socialization: the importance of having an 
“in-camera” setting. This condition suggests that socialization is more likely to succeed in 
an authoritarian setting than in a pluralistic one, where the impact of public scrutiny and 
pressure group influence is more likely to occur and be felt. If this is true, and there is no 
reason why it should not be—the success of authoritarian ASEAN governments in 
forming and developing the association is one example—then it challenges those who 
argue that democracies are more likely to build lasting and more effective institutions, 
including security communities. And herein lies a possible challenge to the socializing 
role of Asian regional institutions. As many governments in ASEAN and Asia 
increasingly confront the forces of democratization, could their regional institutions keep 
up with the task of fostering and deepening socialization? Unlike European institutions, 
Asian regional groups have not made democracy a condition of membership or rewards. 
In fact, they have been illiberal and have attracted new members and support by holding 
up the prospect of non-intervention as a reward. There is a chance that democratization 
may disrupt this apparent authoritarian bent of Asian regional institutions. But on the 
positive side, there is no evidence that democratization has induced inter-state war in 
East Asia and disrupted regionalization or regionalism. On the contrary, it may foster a 16          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 82 
 
 
cooperative security dynamic as evident under recently democratizing regimes in the 
Republic of Korea and Indonesia (Acharya manuscript).  
 
 




ASEAN  APEC ARF 
Viet Nam  Ended occupation of Cambodia 
in 1989; Signed the Paris Peace 
Agreement on Cambodia in 
1991; Observer status in ASEAN 
in 1992; Full ASEAN 
membership in 1995; Chair 
(rotational) of ASEAN in 2001 
and 2010; Leading role in 





interference); Adheres to One 
Southeast Asia concept; Seeks 
peaceful settlement of South 
China Sea dispute but wants 
coverage of the South China 
Sea Code of Conduct to extend 
to the Paracels; Conservative 
and staunch champion of non-
interference principle 
 
Joined APEC in 
1998; Hosted 










Founding member in 1994; Chair of 
ARF 2001 and 2010 
 
Inclusiveness: supported the 
Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea’s admission to ARF 
 
Cooperative security: regular 
participation in the ARF’s 
confidence-building measures and 
capacity-building initiatives; 
Abandoned military alliance with the 
former Soviet Union; Seeks to 
balance but not contain the PRC  




Agreed to multilateral talks with 
ASEAN on the South China Sea 
dispute in 1995; Full Dialogue 
partner of ASEAN in 1996; 
Signatory to Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in 2003; Willing to 
be the first nuclear weapon state 
to sign the Southeast Asia 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 
Treaty; Proposed Free Trade 
Area with ASEAN in 2002, 
agreement to be signed in 2010  









for APEC in 
preference to trade 
liberalization  
Founding member in 1994. 
 
Inclusiveness: supported India’s 
membership in ARF; 
Cooperative security: regular 
participation in confidence-building 
measures and capacity-building 
initiatives;  
Leadership: initiated ARF’s Security 
Policy Conference meeting of 
defense ministry senior officials in 
2004 
 
Excludes Taipei,China issue; 
Opposes full preventive diplomacy 
and conflict resolution role for ARF; 
Opposes raising South China Sea 
dispute in ARF; Wants ARF to 
remain consultative, rather than 
become a problem-solving forum  









ASEAN  APEC ARF 
India  Sectoral dialogue partner of 
ASEAN in 1992; Signatory to 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
in 2003; Full dialogue partner in 
2005; Willing to sign the 
Southeast Asian Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone Treaty if 
asked as a nuclear weapon 
state; India-ASEAN Free Trade 




freeze, but denied  
 





Joined the ARF in 1996 
 
Inclusiveness;  
Cooperative security through 
participation in confidence-building 
measures; Leadership in the ARF’s 
maritime security and counter-
terrorism initiatives; 
 
Seeks to balance but not contain  
the PRC 
 
Excludes Kashmir issue, even 
though Pakistan became an ARF 
member  
 
APEC = Asia-Pacific Economic Forum, ARF = ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
 
Note: This table incorporates five key indicators of socialization: (i) partial or full membership; (ii) participation in key 
multilateral agreements with the institution and its members; (iii) support for the core norms of the institution, (iv) 
leadership and agenda-setting role (indicating interactive or passive participation); and (v) exclusion of issues from 
multilateral approach. Neither the PRC nor India can join ASEAN, whose members alone have the right to host annual 
ASEAN and APEC leaders’ meetings and ARF’s annual ministerial meeting; the relevant forum for them would be full 
dialogue partnership with ASEAN. 
 
 
Of course, socialization in Asia has not been uniformly successful, as the cases of the 
DPRK and Myanmar demonstrate. But these failures can be explained to some extent 
by the absence of the scope conditions of socialization, especially frequency and 
intensity of contact and clash with the prior beliefs of the regimes. In both cases, the 
prior isolation of the regimes (and hence the low intensity and frequency of contact) is 
important. ASEAN’s policy of constructive engagement of Myanmar in the 1990s did not 
involve direct talks with the regime. The Six-Party Talks with the DPRK did provide a 
forum for contact, but it was clearly limited in scope, failing to address Pyongyang’s 
regime insecurity, and paling in comparison with the frequency of dialogues among other 
participants, e.g., between the Republic of Korea and the US, the US and Japan, and 
even the US and the PRC.  Also important in both cases is the prior beliefs of the 
socializee, which is closely related to regime type. To the extent that socialization 
involves overcoming isolationist and autarchic domestic political ideology of the target 
regimes, the deep-seated paranoia of the regimes in the DPRK and Myanmar 
underpinned by their ideologies of national self-reliance—Juche and the “Burmese Way 
to Socialism,” respectively—have conflicted with the call for openness (economic and 
political liberalization, rather than democratization) from the regional institutions. Finally, 
and this applies only to the DPRK, ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions like the ARF 
have been somewhat distant and indifferent interlocutors in Northeast Asian security 
affairs. The Six-Party Talks have been an ad hoc process in line with the US preference 
for a la carte multilateralism. A pre-established Northeast Asian subregional institution 
like ASEAN in Southeast Asia was not around to cushion the dialogue with the DPRK. 
Instead of providing the forum for the socialization of the DPRK, such a mechanism is 
envisaged as a possible outcome of the Six-Party Talks. While the cases of the DPRK 18          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 82 
 
 
and Myanmar attest to the failure of socialization by Asian regional institutions, they do 
suggest the applicability of the conditions of socialization identified by socialization 
theory.  





Type I: Strategic Calculation  
Type II: Normative Suasion/Teaching/Social Influence 
Type III: Bargaining/Role Playing/Mimicking/Social Influence   
 
Notes: Not all mechanisms may be present in every case of socialization. There may be overlap among 
the mechanisms, but the first one (in bold) in the above typology is the mechanisms that is most active 
under different types of internalization. Because Type III internalization is a hybrid, mechanisms from 
Type I and Type III may overlap with those in Type III. This is particularly true of mimicking and social 
influence; although Johnston considers them mainly as non-rationalist mechanisms, hence theoretically 








Strategic Calculation: Tame rising Chinese power 
 
Bargaining/Role Playing/Mimicking: Ensure ASEAN is in the driver’s seat (status), Australia and 
Canada live up to their image as mid-level powers in diplomacy and influence; Use collective pressure 
from the PRC’s neighbors to induce peaceful behavior 
  
Normative Suasion/Teaching/Social Influence: ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation; Familiarize 
the PRC with multilateral negotiations and consensus building in the “ASEAN Way”; Seek pacific 




Strategic Calculation:  Diffuse “[People’s Republic of] China threat” perception; Ensure peaceful 
regional environment conducive to its own economic development; Enhance the PRC’s international 
status and demonstrate the PRC’s peaceful rise; Use ASEAN’s support to influence US position 
towards the PRC, especially any US approach towards containing the PRC 
  
Bargaining/Role Playing/Social Influence: Adopt declaratory confidence-building measures (CBMs) but 
prevent intrusive measures and binding agreements in the CBM and preventive diplomacy (PD) 
negotiations by adopting a limited definition of these concepts; Reject conflict resolution role for ARF  
 
Normative Suasion/Teaching: Offer the PRC’s own five principles of peaceful co-existence as a basis 
for engaging and reassuring neighbors “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
nonaggression, noninterference, equality and mutual benefit” 
 
Outcome: Consistent with Type III internalization; Scope conditions: reputation of the socialize 
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Strategic Calculation: Use ASEAN and APEC as a counter to the EU single market 
Bargaining/Role playing: introduce reciprocity into trade arrangements 




Strategic Calculation: Use the US as a counter to the EU’s single market; Keep the US engaged as a 
regional balancer against rising powers  
Bargaining/Role Playing/Mimicking: Prevent ASEAN’s marginalization in APEC; Location of the APEC 
Secretariat in Southeast Asia; Dilute strict reciprocity in trade agreements 
Normative Suasion/Teaching: promote ASEAN way-like norms, such as developmental regionalism, 
flexible consensus, and concerted unilateralism in APEC 
 
Outcome: Consistent with Type I internalization; Scope conditions: persuader’s lack of reputation as a 
socialiser, insufficient intensity and duration of contact, clash with the prior norms of socializee 
 




Strategic Calculation: To use India as a balancer against the PRC in Southeast Asia; To exploit trade 
and investment opportunities in India 
Bargaining/Role Playing: To gain access to India’s large domestic market without granting it too many 
exceptions; To enhance ASEAN’s reputation and status as a regional integrator and driver of wider 
Asian regionalism 
Normative Suasion/Teaching: Use ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and open regionalism 




Strategic Calculation: to use ASEAN as a stepping stone to regional influence in East Asia and to 
balance the PRC 
Bargaining: To protect elements of India’s domestic sector from competition while gaining access to 
ASEAN’s markets 
Normative Suasion: India’s historic cultural and normative links with Southeast Asia 
 
Outcome:  Consistent with Type II internalization; Scope conditions: reputation of socializee, length and 




APEC = Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ASEAN =Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ARF = ASEAN Regional 
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5.  Socialization and Institutional Design in Asia 
 
As noted, institutions are central to the constructivist view of international 
relations, and socialization is the core function of institutions. But how do the design 
features of institutions (institutional design) shape socialization? What types of design 
features are most conducive to socialization? And conversely, how does having 
socialization as an objective shape institutional design? Socialization is different from 
coercion, sanctions, or other types of negative incentives. Hence, different types of 
institutional designs may offer different potential for the success of socialization. 
Constructivist theory holds that the best chance for success in socialization lies with 
institutions which do not coerce or (materially) constrain, but persuade and (socially) 
pressure. These institutions are more likely to promote behavior on the basis of a logic of 
appropriateness rather than of consequences.  
 
The literature is not uniform when it comes to identifying the elements of institutional-
design, but the following five are important (Acharya and Johnston 2007): 
  
(i)  membership (inclusive or exclusive), 
(ii)  Scope (range of issue areas, multipurpose or issue-specific), 
(iii)  Decision-making rules (e.g., consensus as opposed to majority voting) 
(iv)  Ideology (including ideological flexibility), and 
(v)  Mandate (brainstorming as opposed to problem solving, distributive 
versus deliberative, process over the product). 
 
To this list, one might add institutional foundation and linkages. “These two elements are 
most important particularly when an institution is at the stage of being proposed or is 
evolving. Knowing right on which existing regional institutions/agreements a new one 
should be founded, built on, branch out, and link up to  could increase the possibility of 
its acceptability and success.”
2 
 
The elements of institutional design can affect the socialization capacity of institutions. In 
general, inclusive membership, mutipurposity, decision-making by consensus, and a 
deliberative mandate are more conducive to socialization, as they facilitate persuasion. 
In terms of ideology, ideological flexibility rather than substance is more conducive to 
socialization. In Asian institutions, the link between socialization and institution design 
has been a two-way process. Prior norms developed through interactions and informal 
institutions (e.g., Bandung Conference, 1955, Association of Southeast Asia) have 
influenced the design of formal institutions (e.g., ASEAN). At the same time, institutions 
have rendered these designs stable if not permanent. The ASEAN way thus became the 
basis for the “Asia-Pacific way” and Asia-Pacific institutions like the ARF, APEC, and the 
East Asian community blueprint. The element of path dependency in the design of Asian 
regional institutions is especially striking. 
 
It is clear that decision-making rules and mandates have been crucial to the socializing 
potential of Asian institutions, including ASEAN, APEC, and ARF. All operate by 
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consensus and have a deliberative rather than distributive mandate. The effect of scope 
and membership is less clear. ASEAN expansion has been important to its continued 
relevance in the post-Cold War era, while the ARF’s principle of inclusiveness is what 
has sustained it so far and resulted in the engagement of the PRC and the US. But it is 
unclear whether APEC’s expansion to include Latin American nations has been as 
fruitful, as it raises the question not only of dilution of regional identity, but it also lowers 
the frequency and intensity of contacts, which are crucial to socialization. Ideological 
flexibility has been common to all Asian groups, which have accommodated different 
degrees of openness to market economics, political democracy, and state sovereignty. 
There is no NATO- or EU-style ideology binding Asian institutions. And despite growing 
legalization (Kahler 2000) and formalization (e.g. ASEAN Charter), there is no prospect 
of major and sudden changes to this situation. 
 
6. Conclusion   
 
Constructivists still account for only a small, if growing, number of scholars working on 
Asia’s international relations and regionalism; other perspectives, especially realist 
perspectives, are plentiful and influential. (Constructivists do, however, seem to 
outnumber institutionalist and domestic politics approaches to Asian regionalism.) 
Moreover, as noted, constructivist writings do not constitute a homogeneous category. 
“While all take ideational factors and socialization seriously, they differ on the degree of 
transformation to the existing regional order that they argue is possible. Indeed, 
constructivists are not uniformly optimistic about [Asia's] regional order; aspects of their 
critical perspective on aspects of regional order borders on realism” (Acharya and 
Stubbs 2006).  
 
Despite these differences, the constructivist turn in international relations theory has 
influenced and advanced the study of Asian regionalism and regional institutions in 
important ways. It broadens the understanding of the sources and determinants of Asian 
regional institutions by giving due play to the role of ideational forces, such as culture, 
norms, and identity, as opposed to material determinants. By stressing the role of culture 
and identity, it has helped to link the insights of the traditional area studies approach to 
Asia or Asian states to the larger domain of international relations theory. Constructivism 
has also introduced a less static conception of Asia's regional order. By giving greater 
play to the possibility of peaceful change through socialization, constructivism has 
challenged the hitherto centrality of the balance of power perspective. At the very least, it 
has infused greater theoretical diversity and opened the space for debate, thereby 
moving the study of Asia’s regional relations significantly beyond the traditionally 
dominant realist perspective.  
 
Conversely, constructivist writings on Asian regional institutions have contributed to 
constructivist international relations theory. Like other major theories of international 
relations, constructivism emerged and initially reflected predominantly Western 
intellectual concerns and debates. But it has found a solid foothold in Asia. Constructivist 
writings on Asian regionalism have made some distinctive contributions, as highlighted 
in this essay. One contribution is that ideas and norms that are borrowed from outside 
go through a localization process, rather than being adopted wholesale, before they 
trigger institutional change. This is seen in the ideas of open regionalism and 22          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 82 
 
 
cooperative security in APEC and the ARF, respectively. Second, institutions can 
emerge and achieve success despite great power indifference or opposition. A corollary 
is that institutions created and led by weaker actors can engage and socialize stronger 
states (e.g., ASEAN and the ARF in relation to the US and PRC). Third, institutions need 
not be formal or legalistic in order to play a meaningful role in redefining actor interests 
and identities (e.g., ASEAN way). Finally, the effects of socialization through 
international institutions need not be confined to a Type I (tentative and transitional) or a 
Type II (taken for granted and transformative) outcome, but could also encompass a 
Type III outcome in which actors continue to be motivated by both a logic of 
consequences and a logic of appropriateness on a long-term basis. These insights are 
not just applicable to the Asian context, but have a wider relevance to the study of 
regional and international institutions in general. 
 
But the work is far from complete. Socialization as a tool of analyzing Asian regionalism 
is new and relatively untested. But as Asian institutions proliferate and age, like Europe, 
Asia will provide a vibrant arena for testing socialization theory. In the meantime, 
constructivism’s potential to contribute to a thorough understanding of Asian regional 
institutions remains unfulfilled. Much more empirical research needs to be done before 
one can get answers to some of the basic questions posed by constructivists regarding 
the socializing effects of Asian institutions. For example, it would require investigations 
(through analysis of official records, interviews, and surveys and content analysis) into 
the presence of different mechanisms of socialization including strategic calculation, role 
playing and micro-processes of mimicking, persuasion, norm localization, and social 
influence. This would need to be accompanied by compiling and analyzing indicators of 
the three types of internalization and differences in the behavior of new member states 
of Asian institutions before and after socialization. The work has just begun. 
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